The courts continue to address interesting and challenging
issues under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA). And the EEOC has just proposed new regulations
under the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA).
Here are some highlights.
“Zero Tolerance” For Violence. In Kondas v. Potter,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit considered
a disability case brought against the U.S. Postmaster
General by a technician at a mail processing and
distribution center. During training, Kondas had difficulty
working with instructors and made several statements to them threatening physical violence. Understandably,
the U.S. Postal Service (being the source of
the phrase “going postal”) does not take lightly threats
of violence against co-workers, and Kondas was discharged
based on a “zero tolerance” anti-violence policy.
But he was reinstated following a union grievance, and
resumed where he had left off, again writing aggressive
notes aimed at his instructors. He was then barred from
the training process.
Kondas sued under the Rehabilitation Act, the
ADA’s counterpart for federal employees, claiming disability
discrimination and retaliation. The Third Circuit
affirmed the trial court’s order of summary judgment
for the Postmaster. The court rejected Kondas’ attempt
to equate his treatment to others who had been
involved in drunken brawls but were not barred from
training (none of the alleged drunkards made repeated
threats or were viewed as a continuing threat to trainers’
safety). Nor could retaliatory intent be shown by special
scrutiny given to him under the “zero tolerance” policy
(because the Postal Service had acted similarly in
response to comparable situations in the past).
Bodenstab v. County of Cook, decided by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, also involved
threats of violence against co-workers. Bodenstab, an
anesthesiologist employed at a hospital, was apparently
upset with his cancer diagnosis, after which he declared:
“Well, maybe I’ll take some people with me,” and specified
that he would kill his former chief doctor and four
or five physician co-workers. He predicted that he
would die in an ensuing gun battle with police. After
being suspended, Bodenstab underwent psychiatric
evaluation and treatment. Upon completion, he sought
reinstatement. That request was rejected and his
employment was terminated. He sued, claiming disparate
treatment, failure to accommodate, and retaliation.
He asserted that the hospital “regarded” him as
disabled — i.e., as having an impaired ability to interact
with others. The Seventh Circuit did not decide
whether an inability to interact with others is a “major
life activity” under the ADA or whether Bodenstab was
“substantially limited” in doing so. Instead, the court
disposed of Bodenstab’s lawsuit on the basis that there
was no evidence that the reason for the discharge — his
serious and acknowledged threats of violence — was a
pretext for disability discrimination. As for his failureto-
accommodate claim, the court held there is no ADA
violation when an employer discharges a person based
on misconduct, even if the misconduct is causally related
to a disability. In other words, an employer has no
ADA obligation to accommodate threatening behavior.
No Duty To Accommodate Bad Work. In Scott v.
Commissioner of Social Security, the plaintiff had been a
case management trainee with the Social Security
Administration. Her job involved reviewing and analyzing
medical records; preparing letters, memoranda, and
forms; and responding to written inquiries. Her job
required a high level of accuracy. Soon after her hire as
a trainee, she was found to be making crucial errors,
and was warned several times about unsatisfactory performance.
She was then diagnosed with Attention
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and was prescribed
medications. She reported a better ability to
concentrate, but her work quality did not improve.
When she was discharged, she sued claiming a failure to
accommodate her ADHD condition. A U.S. District
Court in Michigan rejected her claims, reasoning that,
in essence, Scott wanted an accommodation in the
form of removal of job duties that were giving her trouble,
but which were essential to her position. The court
also concluded that, to the extent Scott had requested
reassignment to another position, she had failed to
identify a vacant position for which she was qualified.
Non-Retroactivity Of ADA Amendments Act. As
we noted in our last Insight, the ADAAA was passed in
September 2008, but became effective January 1, 2009.
The amendment significantly broadens the scope of protection
and declares that the focus be moved from strictly
scrutinizing whether a person is “disabled” to determining
whether he or she actually suffered “discrimination.”
Since the passage of the ADAAA a year ago, many
plaintiffs have argued that it should have retroactive effect to claims dating back to September 2008. The
U.S. Courts of Appeals for both the Sixth and the D.C.
Circuits have rejected this argument. In Milholland v.
Sumner County Board of Education, the Sixth Circuit
noted that there is a general presumption against
retroactive application of statutes, and that the text of
the ADAAA shows no intent to reach conduct preceding
its effective date. Similarly, in Lytes v. D.C. Water
and Sewer Authority, the D.C. Circuit viewed the hiatus
between the passage and effective dates as a clear indication
that Congress meant it to apply prospectively only,
i.e., the delay was designed to give fair warning to
affected parties and to protect settled expectations.
These decisions are significant inasmuch as there are
still cases being filed and litigated that involve conduct
that occurred during the hiatus between the September
2008 passage date and the January 2009 effective date.
Those cases should be decided under the old ADA standards,
not the new ADAAA standards.
EEOC Issues Proposed ADAAA Regulations.
Consistent with Congress’ mandate for implementing
regulations for the ADAAA, the EEOC recently issued
a notice of proposed regulations that are focused on the
ADAAA’s expansive interpretation of “disability.”
Among other things, the regulations list impairments
that the EEOC finds will consistently meet the definition
of disability, including autism, cancer, cerebral
palsy, diabetes, epilepsy, HIV/AIDS, multiple sclerosis,
muscular dystrophy, and major depression. They also
state that the determination whether an impairment
substantially limits a major life activity will be based on
a common-sense assessment, comparing the individual’s
ability to perform a specific activity with that of most
people in the general population. An impairment need
not prevent or significantly or severely restrict an individual
from performing a major life activity to be considered
a disability. These proposed regulations clearly
signal a broader application of the ADA, which was of
course one of the expressed purposes of the ADAAA.
Jay C. Boger