The Michigan Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act has
long prohibited discrimination based on pregnancy,
childbirth, and medical conditions related to pregnancy
or childbirth (excepting non-therapeutic abortions not
intended to save the life of the mother). On December
21, 2009, Governor Granholm signed into law a bill
amending the pregnancy discrimination provisions of
the Act to prohibit employers from treating —
an individual affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or
a related medical condition differently, for any
employment related purposes, from another individual
not so affected but similar in ability or
inability to work, without regard to the source of
any condition affecting the ability or inability to
work.
At first glance, this amendment merely appears to
bring Michigan law into line with the federal Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, which defines discrimination
“because of sex” or on the “basis of sex” to include
discrimination —
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical conditions; and women affected
by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions
shall be treated the same for all employmentrelated
purposes, including receipt of benefits
under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not
so affected but similar in their ability or inability
to work.
However, the language “without regard to the
source of any condition affecting the ability or inability
to work” in the Michigan amendment could go much
farther if it is construed to outlaw a practice that is
common among employers — i.e., providing accommodations
in the form of light duty work to employees who temporarily are unable to perform their regular
duties due to work-related injuries, but not to those
who have temporary non-work-related restrictions.
The bill amending the Elliott-Larsen Act was
introduced in the Michigan legislature as a result of a
lawsuit brought by female police officers in the U.S.
District Court in Detroit, Prater, et al. v. Detroit Police
Department et al., which is still pending. According to
the complaint in that case, at one time the Detroit
Police Department had a policy of providing light
duty assignments to officers who were temporarily
unable to perform all of their duties due to pregnancy.
In 2004, the Department stopped offering light duty
to pregnant police officers, as well as others who were
injured off the job. According to the legislative analysis
of the bill, this change was a result of a grievance
brought by a male officer who was injured off the job
and not given light duty. He claimed that pregnant
officers were offered light duty, even though their
inability to work was not job-related, and he should
be allowed the same opportunity for light duty. The
arbitrator ruled in his favor, and, as a consequence,
the Department eliminated all light duty for off-thejob
conditions.
With that history in mind, it is seems likely that
courts will construe the text of the amendment to prohibit
the practice of offering light duty to those
injured on the job, but not offering it to those with
temporary off-the-job work restrictions. However, it is
possible that courts will interpret the phrase “without
regard to the source of any condition affecting the
ability or inability to work” as meaning that the
employer cannot look at the specific source of the
condition, e.g., a pregnancy or a car accident, but that
it can still make a more general distinction between
on-the-job and off-the-job injuries or conditions.
The latter interpretation would be consistent with
the federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act and prior
Michigan law. Federal courts examining the issue generally
have found that is it lawful for an employer to
distinguish between work-related and non-work-related restrictions in the provision of light duty work. Such a policy is “pregnancy blind” as it only looks at
whether the condition was work-related, not whether
it was pregnancy versus some other condition. The
former pregnancy discrimination provisions of
Michigan law also have been construed to allow this
practice.
Many employers have policies or collective bargaining
agreements providing light duty to those temporarily
injured on the job, but not to others. Michigan
employers should consult legal counsel regarding the
implications of this new pregnancy discrimination provision
on their specific policies.
In addition, employers must keep in mind the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) when reviewing
their light duty policies. Under the ADA, employers
are required to provide reasonable accommodation to
employees with protected disabilities (so long as the
accommodation does not constitute an undue hardship),
regardless of whether the disability is work-related
or non-work-related. Reasonable accommodation
may include the elimination of non-essential job functions,
which may produce a light duty assignment in
some cases. But the ADA does not require employers
to provide accommodations, including light duty
assignments, to employees who have medical restrictions
that do not rise to the level of a protected disability.
Nevertheless, many employers voluntarily have
provided light duty for employees who have workrelated
injuries that are not disabilities in order to
reduce workers’ compensation costs. The 2009 amendments
to the ADA broadened the definition of disability
under the ADA, portending that more employees
will be considered disabled under the ADA. Once
again, employers would be prudent to have legal counsel
review light duty policies that are intended to apply
to employees who do not have ADA-defined disabilities
to ensure that they continue to be compliant with
the ADA.
Sonja L. Lengnick